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ABSTRACT 
This study examined the potential for a predictive relationship between political 
conservatism and change detection. Research on the visual system has revealed a general 
tendency to overlook changes in a stationary scene when two versions are displayed 
alternately with a masking slide, known as the flicker paradigm. We examined whether 
political conservatism and various related measures predicted whether and how quickly 
changes were detected during a flicker paradigm task. Measures of interest were 
conservatism as measured by the Social and Economic Conservatism scale, openness as 
measured by the short form of the Big Five Inventory, authoritarianism as measured by 
the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale, political party, and a single bipolar conservatism 
scale.  Despite predictions that greater conservatism and authoritarianism would shorten 
response latencies, analysis of a sample collected online indicated that authoritarianism 
appeared to lengthen the time to identify change, while social conservatism showed the 
expected relationship. This pattern failed to appear in a student sample. Openness and 
other forms of conservatism did not demonstrate reliable significant predictive 
relationships with response latencies. The finding that highly correlated factors (social 
conservatism, authoritarianism) predicted response latencies in opposing directions, 
combined with the failure to replicate that pattern in a student sample, indicates that the 
relationship between conservatism and response latencies may be more complicated than 
initially thought. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The American political system has grown increasingly polarized in recent 
decades, marked by an apparent resistance to working across Congressional party lines 
(Andris et al., 2015).  On one side of the proverbial fence is the Republican Party, 
advocating for small government and traditional social mores.  On the other is the 
Democratic Party, advocating for government aid programs and progressive social mores.  
With cross-party cooperation dwindling, the question of measurable party differences 
looms large.  Though the political climate facing successive generations is ever-changing, 
researchers have begun to seek stable explanations for, and consequences of, political 
affiliation.  The result is a growing body of research on the physiological, behavioral, and 
personality correlates of both party membership and political ideology more generally.  
This research investigated a potential relation between political ideology and visual 
perception, specifically the ability to detect subtle change in a visual scene. 
 
Conceptualizing Political Ideology 
 Political ideology has been represented in myriad different ways, and not without 
controversy.  Researchers like Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway (2003) have used 
measures of personality, such as the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale 
(Altemeyer, 2006), to tap into political ideology indirectly.  Right-wing authoritarianism 
refers to a tendency to idolize leaders and laud tradition to the exclusion of outsiders and 
change.  Jost et al. used this measure as a surrogate for political conservatism in 
particular, under the assumption that conservative ideologies tend to support strong 
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leadership and the status quo.  In the years since their seminal study, however, this 
operationalization has met with some criticism.  Norris (2012) reviews several critiques 
that point to the existence of left-wing authoritarianism, and Altemeyer himself notes that 
authoritarianism may exist at either end of the political spectrum (Altemeyer, 2005).  
Crowson, Thoma, and Hestevold (2005) argued that the RWA scale and political 
ideology, while correlated with one another, showed different patterns of correlation with 
related concepts (such as the Need for Closure scale), and were therefore unlikely to tap 
into the same construct.  Wronski (2015) noted that from 1973 to the late 1980s, people 
high in RWA tended to vote with the Democratic Party, which most today would 
consider a liberal choice.  Wronski theorized that this pattern occurred because high-
RWA voters seek politicians that are demographically similar to themselves rather than 
relying on ideological considerations alone.  As the Democratic Party grew more diverse, 
she posited, high-RWA white voters switched parties.  Despite these critiques of 
authoritarianism as a political construct, it has been consistently found to correlate with 
political conservatism in North American populations (Altemeyer, 2005). 
 A simpler method of assessing political ideology is to use a single-item, bipolar 
rating scale.  For this method, participants are asked to place themselves somewhere on a 
scale from “liberal” to “conservative.”  This approach has been shown to be quite 
predictive, successfully differentiating between those who voted Democratic versus 
Republican in about 80% of cases from 1972 up to 2004 (Jost, 2006).  Nevertheless, it is 
not without setbacks.  Some studies have indicated that people may not be able to 
accurately assess their conservatism or liberalism with a single item, resulting in over- or 
under-estimation of their true attitudes (Zell & Bernstein, 2014).  There have also been 
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some indications that a single item is insufficiently flexible to capture nuanced political 
opinions.  Everett (2013) pointed out that a single-item scale does not differentiate 
between the social and economic dimensions of political ideology.  To address this issue, 
Everett developed the Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS), which divides 
ideology into two separate factors and allows for greater flexibility of analysis. 
 Another common means of identifying political ideology is via the construct of 
Openness, one of the five factors of the Big Five Inventory (BFI) developed by John 
(1990) and John, Donahue, and Kentle (1991).  High-openness individuals tend to have a 
welcoming attitude toward new information and experiences.  The complete long form of 
the scale involves six facets, i.e. openness to: ideas, feelings, actions, values, fantasy, and 
aesthetics.  Studies have consistently found openness to correlate with political ideology 
(Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004; Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Zimbardo, 1999; Onraet, Van 
Hiel, Roets, & Cornelis, 2010), with people high in openness showing greater liberalism.  
Though not necessarily representative of political ideology on its own, openness is 
commonly considered to tap into an important aspect of ideology. 
 
Ideology Beyond Ideas 
 Recent studies of political orientation have consistently found correlations with 
genetic, physiological, and behavioral attributes.  Twin studies have confirmed that there 
is a genetic component to political ideology (Alford, Funk & Hibbing, 2005; Kandler, 
Bleidorn & Reimann, 2012), and a study by Hatemi et al. (2011) used sequences from 
human genomes to identify regions of DNA that may account for political leanings.  
Neurological studies have further bolstered our understanding of ideological differences. 
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Amodio, Jost, Master, and Yee (2007) examined event-related potentials (ERPs) in 
response to performing a new action after having repeated an old action several times.  
They found that more liberal participants experienced greater amplitudes of brainwave 
activity after successfully completing the new action, as well as after accidentally 
continuing the old action (error-related negativity).  This effect appeared to be localized 
within the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the authors theorized that it reflects an 
increased sensitivity to cues that modify habitual behavior.  In a later study, Kanai, 
Feilden, Firth, and Rees (2011) discovered that people who self-identified as liberal 
tended to have increased gray matter in the ACC (which could explain the heightened 
brainwave activity in Amodio et al.’s experiment) compared to those who self-identified 
as conservative.  They also found that the amygdalae of self-identified conservatives had 
greater volume than those of self-identified liberals. 
 The amygdala is a key component in feeling, processing, and recognizing fear and 
other survival-based emotions (Carlson, 2014).  The larger amygdalae of conservatives 
may explain some interesting behavioral findings, including a study by Dodd et al. (2012) 
in which participants were shown images having either a positive valence (i.e. a rabbit) or 
a negative valence (i.e. a spider).  Measures of skin conductance showed greater arousal 
for negative stimuli among conservative participants than liberal participants.  In 
addition, eye-tracking mechanisms found that conservative participants spent more time 
looking at negative images in a collage than did liberal-leaning participants.  Another 
study implicating the amygdala as a factor in political alignment was Vigil’s (2010) study 
of responses to facial expressions pre-tested to appear ambiguous.  Vigil found that 
conservative-leaning participants were more likely to view the ambiguous faces as having 
 5 
a threatening appearance.  This tendency might indicate greater activity of the amygdala 
among those who were ideologically conservative, resulting in increased fearfulness. 
 In addition to being more predisposed toward fear, there is research indicating 
that people high in conservatism are more likely to feel disgust, whether in relation to an 
experience (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012) or a moral decision (Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2009).  The amygdala has also been implicated in the experience of disgust 
(Schienle et al., 2002), indicating a possible connection with the previous findings.  
Evidence also suggests that heightened disgust sensitivity improves the ability to detect 
“impurity” in the form of deviation from pure whiteness in a visual space (Sherman, 
Haidt, & Clore, 2012).  Given the tendency for conservatives to have higher disgust 
sensitivity, the ability to detect off-white shades is likely to follow ideological lines—
suggesting that one’s ideology may influence, or be influenced by, one’s visual 
perception of the world.  Speculation about other perceptual phenomena that may be 
linked to political ideology led to the proposed topic of this study—change blindness. 
 
Change Blindness 
 Change blindness was first made note of by researchers studying reading.  While 
investigating how information is retained during saccadic eye movements, McConkie and 
Zola (1979) noted that reading speed did not change when the letters on a line changed 
cases (i.e. from a to A) during a saccade.  This line of research was continued by Pashler 
(1988), who showed participants a set of letters, followed a second set of letters that was 
either identical to or slightly different from the first.  He found that increasing the interval 
between these two sets of letters made performance on this task difficult, with accuracy 
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ranging from 33 to 71 percent when the inter-stimulus interval was 67 milliseconds or 
greater.  Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark (1997) later applied this type of test to visual 
stimuli, creating a method called the flicker paradigm in which an image and an altered 
version of that image “flicker” back and forth, with a masking slide between.  They found 
that identifying the difference between the pictures was difficult, requiring several flicker 
cycles.  Change blindness has been heavily studied as a visual phenomenon, and research 
has addressed the role of attention (Rensink, O’Regan & Clark, 1997), stimulus type 
(Gusev & Mikhaylova, 2013), and prior experience (Werner & Thies, 1999).  Change 
blindness has even been studied in the context of live interactions, with only about half of 
participants noticing changes in the physical appearance of a live interaction partner 
during a momentary distraction (Simons & Levin, 1998), indicating the extent to which 
change blindness informs our quotidian perceptions. 
 
This Experiment 
 For the proposed experiment, the question of interest lay not in the visual field 
itself, but in how quickly and accurately participants are able to respond to the visual 
change.  Studies of change blindness have indicated that fear (regulated by the amygdala) 
improves performance on change blindness tasks that involve threatening stimuli, such as 
spiders (Mayer, Muris, Vogel, Nojoredjo & Merckelbach, 2006) and angry faces (Lyyra, 
Hietanen & Astikainen, 2014).  Based on the aforementioned research linking 
conservatism to the activity of the amygdala, it would make sense to presume that the 
advantages of fear with regard to change blindness might translate into advantages for 
more conservative people. 
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 Given the large number of constructs used to capture political ideology, it seemed 
prudent to use more than one measure in this experiment.  Despite the uncertain 
relationship between RWA and political ideology, the construct may have value as a 
potential contributing factor to change blindness sensitivity.  Representing a desire to 
maintain the status quo and uphold tradition, right-wing authoritarianism could be said to 
reflect a desire to avoid change.  Though the “change” involved in authoritarianism is 
generally considered to be social, the possibility of a more visceral reaction to real-time 
visual change has never been addressed and cannot be ruled out.  Given Sherman et al.’s 
(2012) finding that participants with stronger negative feelings toward disgusting stimuli 
were better able to identify impurity, we might expect that right-wing authoritarians, who 
feel negatively toward change, would be better able to detect change (and, therefore, be 
less susceptible to change blindness).  Practically, this would mean that they should 
detect the change more quickly and with greater accuracy.  Assuming perceived threat to 
be the impetus of differential performance, we should also expect activation of the 
amygdala to be greater for more authoritarian participants; however, that is beyond the 
scope of this research. 
 In contrast to authoritarianism, trait openness with its free and willing acceptance 
of change might reasonably be expected to correlate with change blindness in the 
opposite direction.  If change were not felt to be a threat, then the drive or incentive to 
identify it would lessen and potentially lower change blindness sensitivity, both in the 
form of accuracy and response latency. 
 Political ideology, which has been correlated with both authoritarianism and 
openness, should, in theory, display a pattern of change blindness sensitivity consistent 
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with the relationships it has with each—namely, those high in conservatism (and, 
theoretically, authoritarianism) should identify changes more readily and with greater 
accuracy than those high in liberalism (and. theoretically, openness).  Political ideology 







  Approval for this study to use human participants was obtained from the 
Missouri State University IRB (January 11, 2016; approval #2016-112).  Participants 
were at least 18 years of age and were recruited from two sources: a large Midwestern 
university and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  A total of 136 people participated in this 
study, seven of whom were removed due to incomplete data for a sample of 129.  Three 
additional participants were removed for reasons discussed in the data cleaning section of 
this paper.  A sample of 56 participants was recruited from lower-level Psychology 
courses at Missouri State University in exchange for course credit.  This student sample 
was contacted via the SONA research participant database.  A second sample of 70 
participants was recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) interface, which 
allows verified MTurk users to complete tasks in exchange for money.  A study by 
Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011) indicated that samples of MTurk users tend to 
demonstrate greater demographic diversity than university samples.  Thus, the inclusion 
of an MTurk sample allowed for a larger, more diverse sample than the SONA database 
offers.  MTurk users received one dollar in exchange for participation.  The demographic 
composition of the two samples appears in Table 1. 
 
Materials  
The Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale (Altemeyer, 2006) contains 20 
statements (plus two practice statements) intended to measure attitudes toward authority 
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and tradition, such as "Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else,” 
(reverse scored) and "This country would work a lot better if certain groups of 
troublemakers would just shut up and accept their group's traditional place in society."  
Agreement with these statements is rated on a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging from -4 
(Very strongly disagree) to 4 (Very strongly agree).  For scoring purposes responses are 
assigned numbers from 1 to 9 and summed, resulting in a possible score range of 20 
points to 180 points.  The minimum encountered in this experiment was 20, while the 
maximum was only 164.  Means, standard deviations, and alphas for this and all other 
scales appear in Table 2, divided by sample. 
The Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS) developed by Everett 
(2013) consists of 12 divisive political issues, to which participants respond by rating 
their general attitude toward that concept on a scale from 0 (negative) to 100 (positive).  
The SECS consists of two factors: social conservatism (seven items, e.g. Abortion) and 
economic conservatism (five items, e.g. Limited Government).  Thus social 
conservatism, which deals with issues of morality, can range in score from 0 to 700.  
Economic conservatism, which deals with issues of regulation and governance, can range 
in score from 0 to 500.  The range represented in this experiment was 29 to 700 for social 
conservatism, and 68 to 500 for economic conservatism.  These factors were analyzed 
separately for this experiment. 
The Big Five Inventory (BFI) is a Likert-type questionnaire containing general 
statements about oneself (i.e. “I am someone who is talkative” or “I am someone who can 
be moody”).  Participants rate whether the statement suits them on a scale of 1 (disagree) 
to 5 (agree).  Each statement measures one of five personality dimensions: openness, 
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conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.  The most current 
abbreviated (44-item) version of the scale was used (John, Naumann & Soto, 2008), and 
only trait openness was included in the analysis.  Openness includes ten items, for a sum 
score range of 10 to 50.  Participants in the present experiment ranged from 21 to 50. 
The flicker paradigm was developed by Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark (1997).  
The flicker paradigm involves two slightly different versions of a photograph that 
alternate rapidly, with a blank slide displayed in between them. Participants are asked to 
indicate when they have noticed the difference between the photographs by hitting a key; 
otherwise, the experiment continues to the next pair of pictures after 60 seconds.  The 
first version of the photograph remains onscreen for 400 ms, with the inter-stimulus 
interval (the blank slide) intervening for 80 ms, followed by the second version of the 
photograph containing one change for 400 ms. Millisecond Software’s InQuisit 4 Web 
was used to display the images, which were drawn from the Change Blindness Database 
maintained by Harvard University (Sareen, Ehinger & Wolfe, 2015).  In the images, 
objects appear and disappear from attractive household scenes. 
In addition to completing the above measures, participants rated themselves on a 
7-point bipolar scale of political ideology ranging from 1 (Strongly liberal) to 7 (Strongly 
conservative).  All of the possible values were represented in the present experiment.  
Participants were also asked which American political party they identify with—




This experiment was administered online. After reading a consent form and 
agreeing to continue with the study, participants took the Big Five Inventory, the Right 
Wing Authoritarianism Scale, and the Social and Economic Conservatism Scale in a 
randomized order.  Then, participants looked for differences among 20 pairs of images 
using the flicker paradigm. Participants were asked to hit the space bar when they 
detected the difference between the two versions, and then describe that difference in a 
text box.  If they did not find it, the flicker task timed out after 60 seconds. They were 
then presented with the next pair of images.  In all, the experiment took 40 minutes for 






Response time data is notoriously prone to messiness (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 
1994), and online collection methods are easy for participants to abuse.  To protect 
against these issues, we took steps to eliminate outliers and non-compliant participants.  
After eliminating non-completers, individual missing data points were imputed to replace 
skipped survey questions if the number of questions did not exceed five percent of the 
participant’s total data using the mice library in R.  We then examined the subset of 
missed/incorrect responses, i.e. flicker trials on which the participant a) timed out of the 
flicker task, or b) gave an incorrect/no response when asked to name the difference 
between photos.  We z-scored the number of incorrect responses per participant for each 
sample separately, and found that one participant from each had a z-score over 3.50, 
indicating that they had missed (or skipped) substantially more flicker trials than the 
other participants in their sample.  These participants were removed, bringing the number 
of participants to 127. 
 A subsequent analysis of Mahalanobis distances including age, single-item 
conservatism, social conservatism, economic conservatism, right-wing authoritarianism, 
and openness revealed one outlier in the University sample, who was eliminated for a 
total of 126 participants.  Finally, we z-scored response latencies for each pair of images 
separately (to account for differences in stimulus difficulty) and removed trials with 
response times exceeding a z-score of 3.5, the cut-off suggested by Van Selst and 
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Jolicoeur (1994).  This procedure resulted in the elimination of 32 trials, 16 from each 
sample. 
 Marmolejo-Ramos, Cousineau, Benites, and Maehara (2014) suggest that an ex-
Gaussian distribution is to be expected when working with response latencies due to the 
slightly delayed floor effect that responding to a stimulus necessitates.  The distributions 
for both samples appeared to fit an ex-Gaussian curve fairly well; however, the samples 
suffered from problems with linearity, homogeneity, and homoscedasticity, which could 
jeopardize the power of the experiment.  Our experimental design helped to offset these 
problems by testing a nested model, which allows participants to have different intercepts 
and thus increases experimental power. 
 
Sample Differences 
 Though our original intent was to join the two samples together for analysis, an 
examination of sample demographics revealed that the samples represented substantially 
different populations.  Chi-square analyses revealed significant differences in the 
distribution of gender (2(1) = 23.13, p < .001), as well as the distribution of political 
party (2(3) = 25.21 p < .001) across samples.  An examination of group membership 
(Table 1) shows that the student sample contained a higher percentage of women, as well 
as a higher percentage of Republican-identifying participants than the MTurk sample.  
The MTurk sample, on the other hand, had a more equal ratio of men to women and a 
higher percentage of Democratic participants.  An independent t-test showed that the 
mean age was also significantly different across samples (t(124) = 10.26, p < .001, d = 
1.84), which is unsurprising given the limited age range of a typical college sample.  As 
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might be expected, the college sample was significantly younger and less varied (M = 
19.02, SD = 1.55) than was the MTurk sample (M = 35.69, SD = 12.07). 
 In light of these demographic dissimilarities we wanted to further examine 
differences between the two samples in terms of our chosen predictors, so we ran a 2 
(database) x 2 (gender) MANOVA with authoritarianism, openness, social conservatism, 
economic conservatism, and single-item conservatism as outcomes.  The MANOVA 
indicated a significant overall effect of sample (F(5, 118) = 5.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .19), as 
well as an overall effect of gender (F(5, 118) = 4.10, p = .002, ηp2 = .15), but no 
interaction between the two.  Further comparisons were made through five separate 2 
(sample) x 2 (gender) between-subjects ANOVAs, which indicated that the college 
sample was significantly higher than the MTurk sample in authoritarianism and all 
measures of conservatism, though not significantly different from it in openness.  Gender 
was significant only for social conservatism (F(1, 122) = 6.03, p = .02, ηp2 = .05), for 
which women had significantly higher scores (M = 462.05, SD = 135.25) than did men 
(M = 323.65, SD = 157.90).  However, since the majority of female participants belong to 
the university sample and the majority of male participants belong to the MTurk sample, 
it is difficult to separate the effects of gender from the effects of other demographic 
differences between the samples.  Table 2 contains means, standard deviations, and 
comparisons across the two samples (excluding gender as it was only significant in the 
case described above).  Based on these findings, we deemed it prudent to analyze the two 




 To examine the relationships between the various measures of conservatism, we 
ran correlations between the measures of interest as well as age. Correlations for the 
university sample appear in Table 3, and correlations for the MTurk sample appear in 
Table 4.  The two samples demonstrated very similar patterns of correlations, with the 
most evident difference being that openness was more highly correlated (negatively) with 
measures of conservatism and authoritarianism in the MTurk sample than in the 
University sample.  This relationship was significant for single-item conservatism and 
authoritarianism, and marginally significant for economic conservatism (p = .07).  No 
significant correlations with openness appeared in the University sample.  In all, 
correlations with openness were generally weaker than hypothesized. 
 Neither sample showed significant correlations between age and the measures of 
interest.  Social, economic, and the single-item assessment of conservatism were all 
significantly positively correlated with each other as well as right-wing authoritarianism 
for both samples, confirming the hypothesis that the concepts are interrelated.  For the 
MTurk sample, correlations between the single-item assessment and both economic 
conservatism and right-wing authoritarianism were high enough to cause some concern 
about the assumption of additivity. 
 
Nesting Models 
 In any analysis involving human participants we can expect a certain amount of 
variability between individual participants, whether due to ability, attentiveness, or 
comprehension.  It would also be logical, in this experiment, for there to be some 
variability attributable to stimulus, since some of the differences between flicker stimuli 
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were easier to spot than others.  Multi-level models allow for different intercepts within a 
group, thereby increasing power by using each piece of information separately.  For 
example, each participant could be allowed a different intercept to account for preexisting 
differences among participants.  Multi-level models also account for the internal structure 
of the data.  In this case, each participant saw each stimulus, so the effect of the 
participant and the effect of the stimulus could combine to create a unique pattern that 
measures of central tendency alone could not capture. 
 To see if these sources of variability were apparent in our dataset, we first tested a 
model with random intercepts permitted for each participant (University AIC = 20697.15; 
MTurk AIC = 27456.15) against a null model (University AIC = 20724.00; MTurk AIC = 
27464.57) and found the random intercepts model to be significantly better for both 
samples (University 2(1) = 28.84, p < .001; MTurk 2(1) = 10.42, p = .001).  We then 
added a second level of nesting, allowing random intercepts for stimulus nested within 
participant (University AIC = 20364.61; MTurk AIC = 27013.35) and found it to be a 
significant improvement as well (University 2(1) =  334.54, p < .001, MTurk 2(1) = 
444.80, p < .001).  We continued to use this nested formulation for the remaining 
analyses. 
 
Response Latency Analyses 
 For our first analysis, we looked only at trials for which the participant correctly 
identified the difference between flicker photographs.  We intended to see how well the 
measured variables (openness, right-wing authoritarianism, social conservatism, 
economic conservatism, single-item conservatism, political party) predicted response 
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latencies (in milliseconds), with the expectation that more conservative participants 
would have faster response latencies.  In order to control for potentially confounding 
variables that were not of interest to this study (i.e. age, gender), we chose a hierarchical 
multilevel model for this analysis.  Using the two-level nested formulation previously 
mentioned we started with age and gender as predictors of response times, and then 
added the other predictors in a second step. 
 University Sample.  For the University sample, the model including age and 
gender (AIC = 20355.46) was significantly better than the null nested model with no 
predictors (2(2) = 13.15, p = .001).  Values for the individual predictors appear in Table 
5.  Gender was a significant predictor, such that females took less time to identify the 
difference in pictures.  Age was marginally significant, with response latencies increasing 
as age increased. 
 For the next step, we added all of the remaining variables of interest: openness, 
right-wing authoritarianism, social conservatism, economic conservatism, single-item 
conservatism, and political party.  This model (AIC = 20342.26) was significantly better 
(2(8) = 29.20, p < .001) than the model containing only age and gender, and the b-values 
for this model are included in Table 6.  Age and gender remained significant, and having 
listed oneself as “Other” with regard to political party appeared to give a significant 
response time advantage over those listed as Republican, Democrat, and Independent.  
Effect sizes for all significant predictors were quite small (age pr2 = .003, gender pr2 = 
.006, party pr2 = .001, authoritarianism pr2 = .001), and none of the relationships had 
been hypothesized. 
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 To test for issues of suppression due to the moderately high correlations found 
between predictors, we removed the variable with the highest variable inflation factor 
(VIF), which was social conservatism (VIF = 2.58).  With social conservatism removed, 
authoritarianism became a significant predictor (b = 15.79, SE = 8.03, t(985) = 1.97, p = 
.05) but the overall model was not significantly different (AIC = 20340.30, 2(1) = 0.04, 
p = .84).  This finding would seem to indicate that suppression was present, however 
authoritarianism’s positive prediction of response latencies is contrary to the 
hypothesized pattern. 
 Mechanical Turk Sample.  In contrast to the University sample, controlling for 
age and gender did not produce a significantly better model than the null nested model 
for the MTurk sample (AIC = 27014.23, 2(2) = 3.12, p = .21), and neither predictor was 
independently significant.  The addition of the remaining predictors for the second step 
significantly improved the model (AIC = 27013.63, 2(7) = 14.59, p = .04), and revealed 
some significant predictive relationships.  Social conservatism demonstrated a significant 
negative prediction of response latencies, such that greater conservatism appeared to 
result in quicker responses.  Authoritarianism, despite its high positive correlation with 
social conservatism, significantly predicted response times in the opposite direction, with 
higher authoritarianism associated with longer response latencies.  Hence social 
conservatism appeared to demonstrate the hypothesized pattern, while authoritarianism 
reversed it.  With the other variables included in the model, female gender became a 
significant positive predictor of response latencies—the opposite of the relationship 
found in the University sample.  Again,  effect sizes for significant predictors were small 
(social conservatism pr2 = .004, authoritarianism pr2 = .001, gender pr2 = .002). 
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 We again used an analysis of variable inflation factors to identify potentially 
problematic variables, and found that single-item conservatism had the highest VIF 
(5.32), which is in line with the fact that it had especially high correlations with both 
authoritarianism and economic conservatism.  We removed it from the equation to see 
what would change as a result, but the resulting model saw no changes in significance or 
direction of prediction and was not significantly different from the model with single-
item conservatism included (AIC = 27012.15, 2(1) = 0.51, p = .47). 
 
Correct Response Analyses 
 For our final analysis, we examined the predictive ability of the measured 
variables (openness, right-wing authoritarianism, social conservatism, economic 
conservatism, single-item conservatism, political party) on whether the participant would 
be able to correctly identify all of the changes between flicker stimuli.  Participants were 
coded as having responded to every item correctly (0), or having one or more 
incorrect/missed item(s) (1). For the University sample, this coding resulted in 32 
participants (57.14%) who missed at least one item, compared to 24 participants got 
every item correct.  The miss rate for the MTurk sample was much lower, with only 26 
participants (37.14%) missing one item or more, and 44 getting every item correct. 
Maintaining the nested structure discussed earlier for theoretical reasons, we ran binary 
logistic regressions predicting whether the responses would be totally correct or partially 
incorrect. 
 University Sample.  As before, we first used only the variables of age and gender 
to predict the outcome (see Table 5).  For this model (AIC = 83.83) neither predictor was 
 21 
significant, and the model was not significantly different from a nested null model with 
no predictors (AIC = 80.49, 2(2) = 0.65, p = .72).  We then added the remaining 
predictors, and the resulting model was not significantly different from the model without 
these predictors (AIC = 95.09, 2(8) = 4.74 p = .78).  No significant predictors appeared.  
With all variables included the model accurately predicted missing at least one item only 
21.88% of the time, and accurately predicted getting every item correct 41.67% of the 
time, for an overall correct prediction rate of 30.36%.  This worse-than-chance prediction 
rate contradicts the hypothesized relationship wherein measures of conservatism predict 
greater accuracy. 
 Mechanical Turk Sample.  The first model, controlling for age and gender (AIC 
= 99.81), was not a significant improvement on the null nested model (AIC = 96.36, 2(2) 
= 0.54, p = .76), nor did it contain significant predictors.  The model containing all 
predictors (AIC = 100.41) was worse than the model containing only age and gender, and 
the difference was marginally significant (2(7) = 13.41, p = .06).  Two predictors 
reached significance in this model, both of which had previously been implicated in the 
regression predicting response times:  social conservatism, which decreased the 
probability of making one or more errors; and authoritarianism, which had a positive 
relationship with that probability.  With all of the predictors included the model 
accurately predicted getting every item correct 86.36% of the time, and missing at least 
one item 42.31% of the time.  Overall, predictions based on the full model were correct 
70% of the time.  While this would seem to indicate better predictions, much of the 
success of this model is probably attributable to the larger overall portion of accurate 
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responses, making it such that any participant classified as getting every item right has a 






 The correlation analyses revealed a number of expected relationships; for 
example, in both samples there were significant positive correlations between all three 
measures of conservatism, as well as right-wing authoritarianism.  Contrary to 
expectation, openness demonstrated little relation to the other variables in the University 
sample, though the negative correlation with single-item conservatism was larger than the 
others.  In the MTurk sample openness had generally stronger relationships overall, 
especially with authoritarianism and single-item conservatism, which reached 
significance.  As hypothesized, all significant correlations with openness were negative, 
indicating that higher scores on conservatism tended to co-occur with lower openness.  
This result is in line with previous findings (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004).  Age did not 
significantly correlate with any of the other variables measured, despite a correlation with 
higher authoritarianism demonstrated in a previous study (Franssen, Dhont & Van Hiel, 
2013). 
 The relatively high correlations between measures of conservatism and 
authoritarianism indicated that the instruments were indeed tapping into related, though 
not identical, concepts.  The strength of the correlations between predictors did cause 
issues with additivity and suppression as indicated by VIFs above 2.5, and these may 
explain some of the regression findings; specifically, when highly correlated measures 
(social conservatism, authoritarianism) predicted outcomes in opposite directions.  
However, removing the variables with high inflation only changed the significance of 
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other predictors in the University sample, for which the conflicting predictions of social 
conservatism and authoritarianism were not present.  In no case did removing variables 
significantly improve the model.  It is also possible that these seemingly contradictory 
findings might indicate an interaction, wherein the predictive impact on response 
latencies is different at different values of conservatism. 
 
Regression Analyses 
 In general, the expected pattern of higher indicators of conservatism predicting 
faster recognition of—and therefore response to—changes in a visual scene received 
mixed support at best.  There was no support for this hypothesis in the University sample, 
for which the only significant predictors were age (indicating that older participants took 
longer to identify changes), listing oneself as belonging to “Other” for political party 
(indicating that participants in this category took less time to identify changes) and 
gender (indicating that females took less time to identify changes).  The limited age range 
(49 of the 56 participants were either 18 or 19), the small number of students in the 
“Other” category (7 out of 56), and the heavily female-skewed sample (47 of 56 
participants were female) make these significant predictors difficult to interpret with 
confidence.  Stronger support appeared in the MTurk sample, with significant effects 
appearing for both social conservatism and authoritarianism; however, these two 
predictors were opposite in the sign of their coefficients, which is puzzling as they were 
significantly positively correlated in the sample.  Gender was also significant but 
indicated a slower response time for females than for males, which is the opposite of the 
pattern found in the University sample.  The more even distribution of gender in the 
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MTurk sample makes this finding somewhat more convincing, though the many 
differences between the samples might also be responsible for the disparate findings. 
 When perfect accuracy was used as an outcome variable, measures of 
conservatism demonstrated a similar pattern of prediction to that in the response latency 
model.  Again none of the variables of interest significantly predicted the outcome in the 
University sample, and this time the demographic variables (age, gender) also failed to 
reach significance.  As before, the MTurk sample offered more interesting findings with 
regard to conservatism, and the same two predictors were implicated: social conservatism 
and authoritarianism (gender was not significant for this model).  Higher scores on social 
conservatism increased the odds of getting every item right, while higher scores on 
authoritarianism decreased those odds.  However, the full model was nearly significantly 
worse than a model containing only control variables (age, gender) for predictors, so the 
findings for this analysis must be treated with care. 
 
Measures of Personality and Politics 
 It could be speculated that the preoccupation with leadership and authority, which 
features heavily in the right-wing authoritarianism scale but is missing from the construct 
of social conservatism, may in some way be responsible for the differential effects of the 
two measures.  Perhaps, for instance, right-wing authoritarians are more hesitant to act 
when uncertain, believing it better to let someone with power and/or prestige make 
decisions and faltering when that influence is absent.  The difficulty and ambiguity of the 
flicker task may have put them at a disadvantage compared to those who set greater store 
by their own perceptions and decisions.  It is also worth recalling the aforementioned 
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debate over whether authoritarianism is indeed an ideological construct or a function of 
the particular sociopolitical climate of a region, and therefore could conceivably correlate 
with traditionally liberal views under different conditions.  With this in mind, it could be 
that despite the high correlation between authoritarianism and measures of conservatism 
their content areas are dissimilar enough for a truly opposite pattern of prediction to 
appear. 
 Of the measures of conservatism used in this study, social conservatism perhaps 
most closely resembles the emotionally-laden, fear- and disgust-driven form of 
conservatism with which Graham et al.’s (2009) study of disgust was concerned.  
Pertaining to emotionally “hot” topics such as abortion and traditional marriage, social 
conservatism is likely the facet that best taps into the predicted relationship wherein the 
amygdala is more readily activated and response latencies shortened as a result.  This 
idea was precisely the pattern demonstrated in the MTurk sample, though the University 
sample did not display the same relationship.  Better performance in terms of correct 
responses was also associated with higher social conservatism.  Economic conservatism, 
on the other hand, was not a significant predictor in any of the models tested, and a look 
at the items included in the scale might indicate why: unlike social conservatism, a 
favorable attitude toward fiscal responsibility and business is not likely to involve the 
emotional inputs that social conservatism does.  If the amygdala is a key player in the 
differences in perceptual ability between people at opposite ends of the ideological 
spectrum, then the stronger relationship of the more emotionally-charged social 
conservatism is understandable.  As for the single-item measure of conservatism, no 
significant predictive relationship appeared for any model.  Again high correlations were 
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present (especially in the MTurk sample) and may have caused suppression—particularly 
in the case of single-item conservatism, as it had two of the highest correlations of any 
found in the sample.  Political party was significant only for the University sample, and 
as the only group that differed significantly from the rest was the ambiguous “Other,” it is 
difficult to draw conclusions regarding conservatism from this finding. 
 Openness did not display the predicted (or any) relationship to response latencies 
or response correctness.  Personality factors not controlled for may have intervened in the 
expression of openness on response times—for instance, a more conscientious or 
agreeable participant might have been more willing to pay extended attention to the 
flicker task and performed better as a result.  It is also plausible that the quality of 
openness, a multi-faceted concept involving many life domains, is too general a concept 
to predict specific visual phenomena. 
 
Sampling and Stimuli Issues 
 The consistent, significant differences between the two samples present striking 
evidence of an oft-acknowledged (but seldom addressed) issue with university-based 
research: university samples are frequently taken to represent the wider population when, 
in fact, they rarely do.  Though Mechanical Turk has its own limitations (access to a 
computer, familiarity with Amazon.com), it did provide a more varied (and compliant) 
sample than did the University database.  Additionally, characteristics of a University 
population tend to vary depending on the reputation, location, and emphasis of the 
school.  The sample culled from a large, public Midwestern university may not match the 
sample culled from a small, private Northwestern university, for example.  While not 
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directly related to the research at hand, the substantive difference between samples is 
worth noting. 
 Another possible contributor to the somewhat inconclusive findings is the nature 
of the stimuli used.  The change blindness studies linking fear to faster recognition of 
change (Mayer et al., 2006; Lyyra et al., 2014) both used evolutionarily important, fear-
inducing stimuli.  In the current experiment, stimuli were relatively mundane and non-
threatening.  The appearance and disappearance of a wall hanging, though surprising, is 
unlikely to pose a threat to health and safety—and by that token, less likely to activate the 
amygdala.  In this vein, a study Achaibou, Loth and Bishop (2016) found that the 
amygdala was preferentially activated when participants engaged in a flicker task 
containing threatening stimuli (angry faces) as opposed to non-threatening stimuli 
(houses), for which areas of the frontal cortex were activated instead.  The relatively 
weak contribution of the amygdala to non-threatening change detection could indicate 
that the activity of the amygdala associated with conservatism does not offer a great 
advantage for non-threatening stimuli.  The nature of the stimuli may have limited the 
effect of conservatism by failing to tap into fearful or threatening scenarios. 
 
Conclusion and Future Directions 
 The results of this experiment defy easy interpretation, but open the door for 
further exploration.  The nature of the relationship between authoritarianism and 
conservatism has interested many researchers in the past (Norris, 2012), and here we find 
evidence both affirming (high correlations) and disconfirming (differential predictions) 
the idea that they are essentially the same.  The relationship between social and economic 
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conservatism—ways in which they differ, their origins and correlates, similarities and 
predictions—also merits further exploration as their differential performance in the 
current study lends credence to Everett’s (2013) suggestion that they be treated as 
separate constructs.  Finally, the main question of interest remains: do ideological 
leanings relate to one’s ability to detect visual change?  The concept received support 
only in some samples, only for some measures of conservatism, and in apparently 
contradictory directions.  This may be an indication that the relationship is more complex 
than initially believed, and that different facets of ideology could represent (or produce) 
different effects. 
 Potential future directions are numerous, such as including a liking component to 
determine whether an emotional response, rather than a physical response, might 
accompany the experience of visual change—i.e. do people prefer stimuli that do not 
change to stimuli that do, and if so does this preference follow ideological lines.  
Recording the activity of the amygdala would also offer insight into its potential 
mediating role in responses to change, indicating whether increased activity in the 
amygdala improves chances of noticing visual change.  Lastly using different, threatening 
stimuli might affect the relationship between conservatism and change detection, and in 
particular we might expect the effect of conservatism to be strengthened when the already 
active amygdala is excited.  With these questions in mind the continued exploration of 
the perceptual causes, correlates, and consequences of ideology could prove to be a 
fruitful endeavor.  The present study offers an interesting, unexplored perspective with 
enough significant findings to merit further study.  The question of physical, 
psychological, and perceptual differences in conjunction with ideology could explain 
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some of the most passionate political disagreements of our time.  Understanding 
changeable and inconstant constructs such as political party affiliation from a deeper 
perspective could lead to a more compassionate view of diverse ideological perspectives. 
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Table 1. Demographics for University and Mechanical Turk Samples 
 University Sample MTurk Sample 
 N % N % 
Gender:     
   Female 47 83.93 28 40.00 
   Male 9 16.07 42 60.00 
Ethnicity:     
   Not Hispanic or Latino/a 53 94.64 64 91.43 
   Hispanic or Latino/a 2 3.57 5 7.14 
Race:     
   White 51 91.07 55 78.57 
   Black 3 5.36 3 4.29 
   Native American/Alaska 
Native 
1 1.79 1 1.43 
   East Asian 0 0.00 6 8.57 
   South Asian 1 1.79 1 1.43 
   Multiracial 0 0.00 2 2.86 
   Other 0 0.00 2 2.86 
Political Party:     
   Republican 25 44.64 13 18.57 
   Democrat 10 17.86 35 50.00 
   Independent 14 25.00 22 31.43 
   Other 7 12.50 0 0.00 
Note: Percentages based on sample totals 
  
 Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Difference Statistics for University and Mechanical Turk Samples 
 University Sample MTurk Sample Mean Differences 
 M SD  M SD  F p p2 
Authoritarianism 87.61 24.17 0.89 56.44 35.17 0.96 23.37 <0.001 0.16 
Openness 35.36 5.88 0.73 37.63 6.98 0.87 2.03 0.15 0.02 
Social Conservatism 497.14 108.16 0.80 333.14 157.04 0.86 22.20 <0.001 0.15 
Economic Conservatism 317.54 65.60 0.58 266.51 97.52 0.79 10.52 0.002 0.08 





Table 3. Correlations Between Measures of Conservatism, Openness, Authoritarianism, 
and Age for the University Sample 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Age      
2. Single-Item Conservatism 0.00     
3. Economic Conservatism 0.04 0.42**    
4. Social Conservatism 0.03 0.35** 0.52**   
5. Right-Wing Authoritarianism 0.14 0.39** 0.42** 0.63**  
6. Openness -0.03 -0.18 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 
* p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 4. Correlations Between Measures of Conservatism, Openness, Authoritarianism, 
and Age for the Mechanical Turk Sample 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Age      
2. Single-Item Conservatism 0.13     
3. Economic Conservatism 0.06 0.72**    
4. Social Conservatism 0.17 0.59** 0.40**   
5. Right-Wing Authoritarianism 0.11 0.71** 0.49** 0.65**  
6. Openness 0.05 -0.24* -0.22 -0.18 -0.43** 
* p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 5. Regression Statistics for the Prediction of Response Latency in the University 
Sample 
  
 b SE(b) t df p 
Step 1:      
   Age 206.31 110.83 1.86 992 0.06 
   Female (vs. Male) -1165.67 464.08 2.51 992 0.01 
Step 2:      
   Single-item Conservatism 279.51 156.25 1.79 984 0.08 
   Economic Conservatism -5.67 3.30 1.72 984 0.08 
   Social Conservatism 0.51 2.51 0.20 984 0.88 
   Right-Wing Authoritarianism 14.56 10.08 1.44 984 0.12 
   Openness -42.19 29.50 1.43 984 0.16 
   Democrat (vs. Republican) 218.36 565.64 0.39 984 0.71 
   Independent (vs. Republican) 525.91 483.84 1.09 984 0.27 
   Other Party (vs. Republican) -1675.53 586.36 2.86 984 0.004 
   Independent (vs. Democrat) 307.55 535.89 0.57 984 0.57 
   Other Party (vs. Democrat) -1893.89 676.00 2.80 984 0.005 
   Other Party (vs. Independent) -2201.44 612.98 3.59 984 <0.001 
   Age 297.90 117.51 2.54 984 0.01 
   Female (vs. Male) -1359.71 513.91 2.65 984 0.008 
 40 




 b SE(b) z df p 
Step 1:      
   Age 18.39 14.39 1.28 1304 0.20 
   Female (vs. Male) 470.227 351.29 1.33 1304 0.18 
Step 2:      
   Single-item Conservatism 165.60 231.86 0.71 1297 0.46 
   Economic Conservatism -3.85 2.63 1.46 1297 0.14 
   Social Conservatism -5.39 1.82 2.97 1297 0.003 
   Right-Wing Authoritarianism 17.51 8.89 1.93 1297 0.05 
   Openness -18.05 28.85 0.63 1297 0.53 
   Democrat (vs. Republican) -192.76 747.39 0.26 1297 0.80 
   Independent (vs. Republican) -238.52 645.58 0.37 1297 0.71 
   Independent (vs. Democrat) -45.76 503.00 0.09 1297 0.93 
   Age 26.39 15.23 1.73 1297 0.08 
   Female (vs. Male) 972.94 425.34 2.29 1297 0.02 
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Table 7. Regression Statistics for the Prediction of Committing One or More Errors in the 
University Sample 
 b SE(b) z df p 
Step 1:      
   Age -0.23 0.29 0.78 52 0.43 
   Female (vs. Male) -0.10 0.77 0.12 52 0.90 
Step 2:      
   Single-item Conservatism -0.15 0.35 0.43 44 0.67 
   Economic Conservatism 0.44 0.38 1.14 44 0.27 
   Social Conservatism -0.66 0.47 1.40 44 0.16 
   Right-Wing Authoritarianism 0.45 0.42 1.08 44 0.28 
   Openness -0.34 0.31 1.10 44 0.27 
   Democrat (vs. Republican) -0.06 0.96 0.07 44 0.95 
   Independent (vs. Republican) -0.19 0.81 0.23 44 0.82 
   Other Party (vs. Republican) -0.13 1.00 0.14 44 0.89 
   Independent (vs. Democrat) -0.12 0.91 0.13 44 0.89 
   Other Party (vs. Democrat) -0.07 1.14 0.06 44 0.95 
   Other Party (vs. Independent) 0.05 1.03 0.05 44 0.96 
   Age -0.29 0.32 -0.90 44 0.37 




Table 8. Regression Statistics for the Prediction of Committing One or More Errors in the 
Mechanical Turk Sample 
 
 
 b SE(b) z df p 
Step 1:      
   Age -0.05 0.25 0.20 66 0.85 
   Female (vs. Male) -0.37 0.51 0.72 66 0.47 
Step 2:      
   Single-item Conservatism 0.23 0.64 0.36 59 0.72 
   Economic Conservatism 0.15 0.41 0.37 59 0.71 
   Social Conservatism -1.71 0.74 2.31 59 0.02 
   Right-Wing Authoritarianism 1.27 0.63 1.99 59 0.05 
   Openness 0.20 0.35 0.58 59 0.56 
   Democrat (vs. Republican) -0.77 1.18 0.65 59 0.51 
   Independent (vs. Republican) -0.15 1.12 1.37 59 0.17 
   Independent (vs. Democrat) -0.78 0.89 0.87 59 0.38 
   Age 0.03 0.29 0.09 59 0.99 
   Female (vs. Male) 0.47 0.70 0.67 59 0.50 
